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 The European Courts: A Procedural Analysis 
 
Santini Reali 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
According to Article 220 of the European Community Treaty, the Court of Justice and the Court 
of First Instance shall ensure that in the interpretation and application of the Treaty and the law 
are observed. While on its face this provision may seem quite clear, its application is a bit more 
convoluted, as the role of the supranational Courts in Europe is not as stable and precise as it may 
first appear. In analyzing the structure of the Courts, the malleable manner in which challenges 
may be brought,  coupled with certain transparency issues,  and  caustic critiques, depict the 
simplicity, which once appeared so enticing, as much more intricate. In coming to understand the 
inherent complexity present in this system, it becomes necessary to first understand the structure 
and composition of the Courts. From there, the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance and the 
European Court of Justice become important as well. Delving into the various types of challenges 
that may be brought to the Courts’ attention guides one towards understanding the power of the 
supranational  Courts  to decide matters and enforce decisions.  Finally, critiquing  the system 
uncovers the lack of transparency, and for that matter, accountability present, as well as a massive 
backlog of cases exposing  the somewhat disorganized nature of the massive branch of 
government. It is only when  detailed  insight into  the operation of the legal procedures is 
understood that an educated view into the European legal system emerges; one that is not as tidy 
and orderly as the European Union may have wanted it to be. 
 
II.  Structure of the Courts 
 
The structures and compositions of the Court of First Instance (CFI) and the European Court of 
Justice (ECJ) are at first quite straight forward. The ECJ was founded in 1952 and is based in 
Luxembourg (EUnavigator). The Member States appoint the judges to both Courts, provided 
there is consensus. Each state appoints one judge to the ECJ and one to the CFI id.  The judges 
vote and select a president of the Court of Justice, analogous to the Chief Justice of the Supreme 
Court in the United States  Id.  Once elected, the president directs the judicial business and 
calendar id. There are also eight Advocate Generals who write preliminary opinions on the cases 
that come before the Court id. Involvement of an Advocate General is no longer compulsory in 
every case (Bradley Blog). Following the Treaty of Nice, the Court itself may decide whether an 
opinion of the Advocate General should be submitted (Bradley Lecture).  
The ECJ is the supreme legal authority in the EU (Costa  ENEL), with the Court of First 
Instance created to help reduce the workload of the ECJ. One of the glaring faults with the Courts 
is their size. With twenty-seven judges sitting on both Courts, they become unwieldy judicial 
bodies. As EU enlargement continues decisions will have to be made as to when to freeze the 
courts. The problem then becomes one of enforcement. Enforcing judgments on nations who are 
not represented in the Courts may cause animosity and backlash. This would be the antithesis of 
the purpose in the creation of the bodies in the first place. As a partial means of rectifying this 
conflict, both Courts may either sit in Grand Chambers, with all judges in attendance, or in 
smaller chambers, with only some judges in attendance. According to the Commission this may 
also prove problematic as it may lead to inconsistency in case law. 
It is imperative to note that the judges are not considered representatives of  their 
individual member states (Bradley Lecture). According to Article 223 of the Treaty, the judges 
are independent of political influence and are appointed for six-year terms. Judges can only be 
removed by a unanimous vote by  their associates. (Bradley Lecture). Their anonymity is  
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protected by the fact that their decisions are written anonymously. This fact is reinforced by 
Article 3 of the Rules of Procedure which states, “a Judge shall take the following oath: I swear 
that I will preserve the secrecy of the deliberations of the Court.” Some believe this has led to a 
lack of accountability and transparency, which will be discussed further.   
 
III.  Jurisdiction 
 
Where jurisdiction is concerned, the Court of First Instance hears claims brought by and for the 
following: individuals against acts of Community Institutions which are of direct concern to 
them; actions brought by the Member States against the Commission; actions brought by the 
Member States against the Council; actions to establish extra-contractual liability, actions based 
on an arbitration clause, actions concerning the Community trade mark and the protection of 
Community plant variety rights,  and member states.  (Bradley Lecture). 
The European Court of Justice has the supreme jurisdiction in the EU (Costa  ENEL). It 
hears the following actions: actions for failure to fulfill obligations (Articles 226 to 228), actions 
for annulment and for declaration of failure to  act of an institutional nature, brought by the 
Member States (Articles 230 and 232), actions for annulment or failure to act brought by an 
institution of the Communities or the European Central Bank against acts of or failures to act by 
the European Parliament or the Council, direct actions brought by institutions and Member States; 
appeals of decisions by the Court of First Instance (Articles 225(1)(2));  references for a 
preliminary ruling on interpretation or on validity made by national courts (Article 234); requests 
for an opinion (Article 300). 
 
IV.  Enforcement Power 
 
It is imperative to first understand the enforcement power behind the Courts, for without 
enforcement, they are simply powerless bodies barking orders at powerful Member States. The 
enforcement power of the ECJ has proven to raise significant concerns. If a Member State does 
not comply with its treaty obligations  in one way or another, the Commission or the other 
Member States have standing to bring an enforcement action against the state in noncompliance 
(Article 227). Although Member States posses this valuable power, it is very rarely used; 
especially when compared to large supply of Treaty infringement issues (EU XXI Commission 
Report). Member States may be hesitant to use this power as it could provide a basis for ill will 
between nations. This is a double edged sword as nations may continue in their noncompliance, 
because other Member States do not wish to bring a challenge for fear of later repercussions.  
The Commission has recognized this problem and has implemented various techniques to 
quell the need for enforcement actions. For instance, the Commission will use a regulation where 
possible to avoid the need to transcribe a directive into national law. The benefit of a regulation is 
that it becomes law simultaneously in all Member States once it passes. This would cut out the 
interpretation of national governments in putting forth laws to enact a directive. Another solution 
to avoid enforcement actions has been the use of “soft law”. Soft law puts forth standards or 
codes of conduct without the strict legally binding rules of regulations or directives (Bradley 
Lecture). Therefore, there are rarely compliance issues that would lead to enforcement actions 
associated with “soft law” (Commission Communication).  
The ECJ does have the power to impose a fine under Article 228. This power is used 
rarely but has been exercised several times including a penalty imposed on France under Article 
228 for its noncompliance with fishery conservation rules (Commission v. France). The ECJ has 
also ruled that states can be liable for their failure to enforce EU directives and regulations. This 
precedent was established in Andrea Francovich and Others v. Italian Republic. In that case 
workers  suffered  damages after their employer became insolvent. Under EU Directive 
80/987/EEC, the workers were entitled to compensation for their damages. Italy had not yet  
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implemented the EU Directive and the ECJ found Italy liable for the damages. (Francovich and 
Others v. Italian Republic). 
 
V.  Challenges Brought Before the Courts 
 
The CFI and ECJ are not only accountable for adjudicating enforcement actions, but are also 
responsible for ruling on whether EU institutions are complying with their community law 
obligations. Under Article 230 a Member State or other institution can bring a challenge before 
the ECJ if it feels another institution has breached its duty.   
It should also be noted that in rare instances individual persons may bring a claim under 
Article 230. The challenge must be “of direct and individual concern” to the individual (Article 
230). This basically amounts to very few cases falling within this limitation as, “At the point 
where a EU authority sought to enforce the regulation against an individual or firm that individual 
or firm would have the right to challenge the enforcement action and also the regulation on which 
it was based” (Bradley Blog). In order for an individual person or firm to bring a challenge they 
must first set themselves apart from others, and show that the challenge would only apply to their 
particular circumstances. The ECJ describes this in Plaumann v. Commission: 
Persons other than those to whom a decision is addressed may only claim to be 
individually concerned if that decision affects them by reason of certain attributes 
which are peculiar to them or by reason of circumstances in which they are 
differentiated from all other persons any by virtue of these factors distinguishes 
them individually (Plaumann v. Commission). 
 
       This process is also evidenced in the case of Codorniu SA v Council of the European Union. 
In this case, a Spanish company had produced a product called “Gan Cremant de Codorniu” for 
many years. The ECJ stated that the firm did therefore have standing to challenge an  EU 
Regulation which stated that the word “cremant” could only be used to describe similar products 
from France and Luxembourg.  
Another means of reaching the ECJ comes from the preliminary reference procedure. 
This procedure dictates that national courts may refer a question of European Union Law to the 
ECJ. This helps to ensure the uniformity of law throughout the European Union  by giving 
national courts the option of asking for help in rulings on these, sometimes complex, issues. This 
sentiment is echoed in the Working Party’s Report: 
Through the direct dialogue which it has made possible between each national court and the 
Court of Justice, as the supreme judicial body in the Community, through the authority and 
certainty of the answers it thereby gives to the questions raised and through the simplicity of its 
operation, the uniform application of Community law throughout the Union, thereby forming the 
keystone of the Community’s legal order (Working Party, 12). 
        This process is exemplified in the case of Wilhelm v. Bundeskartellamt. In Wilhelm, the 
Commission began proceedings under Regulation 17 against several dyestuffs manufacturers, 
including 4 German companies, for allegedly engaging in concerted activity in the pricing of 
aniline in violation of EC Treaty  Article 81.  Later that year the German Bundeskartellamt 
imposed fines on these German companies under the German law against restraints on 
competition. The companies challenged the Bundeskartellamt decision before a Berlin court, 
which sought a preliminary reference ruling on the question of whether the Bundeskartellamt 
could take action against conduct that at the time was the subject of proceedings before the 
Commission.  (Wilhelm v. Bundeskartellamt).  These preliminary references help guide the 
national courts toward the trend of the European Union supranational law (Cohen).  
  The preliminary reference process only works if the national courts make a reference to the 
ECJ. There is, however, no incentive to do so. Further, under the Acte Claire Doctrine, a national 
court is not required to refer a question of European Union Law to the ECJ; thereby adding to the  
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disintegration of European Law (Working Party 14). It is also unclear whether the Courts would 
prefer the national courts to use this procedure. The more it is used, the greater the burden it 
places upon the ECJ because of increasing caseloads. (Lanearts, 212).   
 
VI.  Critiques 
 
One of the main critiques of the European Union Court system is the system’s faltering ability to 
hear many cases. There are simply too many cases for the Courts to hear. In the Court of First 
Instance alone there were 171 cases is 1992 and by 1998 1,007 cases. (Working Party, 8). In 1998 
the average time to examine and adjudicate a case was 32.2 months. This is a serious problem. If 
the Courts are not accessible the legal authority loses its credibility. Further, according to Arnull, 
the overcrowding in the Courts  is exacerbated by the fact that, “European law is no longer 
confined to the realm of trade and commerce, but reaches into the nooks and crannies of national 
life” (Arnull, 516). This means that as the areas of law that the European Courts are afforded the 
right to rule upon expands, there are more cases in varying areas of law on their docket.  
Similarly, the preliminary reference procedure has put more stress on the Courts as the 
ECJ strives to provide more substantial and direct rulings, rather than abstract rulings, which 
leave some of the guess work with the national courts. In putting forth these direct rulings, or 
“response utiles”, the Courts have the adverse affect of narrowing the holdings of the cases. This 
thereby  allows  for similar challenges to be brought forth in future  claims. (Arnull, 217).  
According to some accounts the ECJ takes the opportunity to weigh in on national court rulings in 
order to expand European Union law beyond the scope of the Treaty (EUobserver.com). 
There have been several suggestions to alleviate the massive caseload. One suggestion 
involves setting up a “devolved judicial bod[y] specializing in preliminary rulings” (Working 
Party, 21).  This would help dislodge cases from stagnation and free up the CFI and ECJ to deal 
with significant matters of European Union Law. However, this would prove to be a difficult fix 
as the conversational approach between the CFI and the national courts would be usurped. Once 
the dialogue between the national courts and the European Courts is interrupted by this proposed 
middleman, it is likely that cracks would form in the uniformity of interpretation of Union Law, 
thereby circumventing the whole purpose of the preliminary reference procedure. 
  A second critique of the court system stems from problems with the Union’s 
enlargement. The Court System is already strained. It costs massive amounts of money to run the 
current system and it is already quite large. As enlargement continues the amount of litigation 
will also undoubtedly increase. If the Courts are already having difficulty hearing the current 
number of cases what will they do once three or four more members enter the European Union?   
Similarly, with an influx of new Member States come additional languages. This presents 
a serious operational hurdle. There are currently eleven procedural languages in use (Working 
Party, 9). Many of the procedural documents filed from the individual Member States must be 
translated into a single working language. Then, all judgments and orders must be translated into 
the other languages. This process represents an enormous cost, increase in time, as well as a 
necessary increase in bureaucratic infrastructure; all of which lead to increased spending. 
Transparency is a very important issue for the ECJ (Commission Report 2003). The lack 
of transparency within the Courts’ decisions has led to Member States not knowing if a judge has 
criticized his or her own state in an opinion. Further, the judicial record for the Courts will not 
necessarily provide insight into how the judges will rule on a particular matter (Bradley Lecture). 
An attorney cannot play off of the individual attitudes and personalities of judges, such as is done 
in the United States. On its face, this may appear to supply a system free from personal biases and 
opinions; conversely, the anonymity may lead to judges voicing even stronger personal 
convictions within the confines and secrecy of the chambers. Even more, the decisions of the 
European Court of Justice are not reviewable. There is no body in place, judicial or otherwise, 
that can receive a case on appeal from the European Court of Justice. (Bradley Blog). With this in  
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mind it is easy to see why many have criticized the ECJ for its lack of transparency. Final 
decisions seem easier to make when no one in particular can be held accountable; however, yet 
again there is a converse argument as, because of the lack of accountability, the judges are more 
apt to make the difficult decisions free from the political influence that is often present in 
Supreme Court decisions in the United States. 
 
VII.  Conclusion 
 
The Court system of the European Union, once a shining beacon of legal streamlined procedure, 
now appears to waiver under the demands of the 21
st century. The fledgling institution does not 
have the history and tradition of the older national courts, and as such, is constantly seeking its 
place in the supranational identity of the European Union. Revolutionary in its creation, 
inordinate in its size, and multi-lingual in its procedure, the Courts represent the unity present in 
the diversity of the Union as a whole. It is unclear as to whether the current legal system will be 
able to meet the demands of the supranational behemoth that is the European Union. 
Overwhelming caseloads, transparency issues, enormous procedural costs, and slow adjudication 
seem to dictate that major changes will be needed for the current system to maintain its place as 
the supreme legal authority in the European Union (Costa v ENEL).  However, European 
ingenuity and ability to adapt should never be underestimated. It is likely that when the negatives 
outweigh the positives we will see adaptations, new expectations, and procedural reforms from 
across the pond. 
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